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qUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals committed 
reversible error by affirming the order of May 9, 1985 of the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, wherein said Third 
District Court ruled as a matter of law, without adequate 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, that Plaintiff-Respondent 
Celia Sherwood Tipton was not a partner in the Winecup Ranch, but 
that the interest in the Winecup Ranch granted her in the Decree 
of Divorce of March 4, 1983 was, in fact, one-half (1/2) of the 
share of Defendant-Appellant Monte Dee Tipton. 
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals committed 
reversible error by affirming the order of May 9, 1985 of the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, wherein said District 
Court ruled as a matter of law without adequate findings of fact 
or conclusions law that there existed no factual basis or change 
of circumstances sufficient to modify the Decree of Divorce of 
March 4, 1983 to reallocate the parties1 debts and obligations, 
and in particular those tax obligations owed to the Internal 
Revenue Service because of income received through the Winecup 
Ranch. 
1 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The instant petition seeks review of the ORDER OF 
AFFIRMANCE of the Utah Court of Appeals, considered by that Court 
sua sponte as an expedited appeal pursuant to Rule 31, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, and entered by that Court without 
written opinion on November 20, 1987. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Petitioner seeks review of the ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, entered November 20, 1987. This 
Court, by ex-parte order of December 20, 1987, granted an 
extension under Rule 45(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, to 
allow filing of this petition through January 19, 1988. This 
Court has jurisdiction to decide the matters presented herein by 
virtue of 78-2-2(3)(a), Utah Code. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
48-1-4, UCA. In determining whether a partnership 
exists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, persons who 
are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third 
persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by 
entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership, 
does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-
owners do or do not share any profits made by the use of the 
property. 
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persons c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e r e p res e n, t a t i o n 
Rule 52, Rules of Civil Procedure. (a) Effect. In all 
actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the extent 
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings 
of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under 12(b), 50 (a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later 
than ten days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) By default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) By consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) By oral consent in open court, entered in the 
minutes. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter is domestic by nature and concerns 
ramifications of the divorce of these parties on March 4, 1983. 
The major contention is which party should pay federal tax 
liabilities exceeding $300,000.00 principal and with penalties 
and interest approximating $1 million on income received from the 
Sierra Pacific Note, a marital asset the parties agreed to divide 
between themselves. 
Mr. Tipton!s contention is that Mrs. Tipton received a 
partnership share of the note and that she should be liable for 
federal income taxes on her share. Mrs. Tipton argues that the 
amounts she received were not a partnership share and that her 
ex-husband should pay all taxes on all amounts received by either 
of them from the Sierra Pacific Note. 
This and other matters were raised by the parties 
after the divorce, all of which were heard at trial on March 21, 
1985, although the order reflecting th0 Court's ruling was not 
entered until May 9, 1985. On May 20, 1985, Mr. Tipton filed his 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; TO TAKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY; TO AMEND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5 AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT, 
which was denied by the Court on May 20, 1985. 
5 
This case was then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
on May 19, 1986, and later assigned to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Mr. Tipton sought reversal of the trial court's order 
of May 9, 1985 and his amended notice of appeal of June 13, 1986 
sought reversal also of the trial court's order of May 20, 1986. 
After oral argument held on November 18, 1987 the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 31 of its rules, entered its 
expedited order of affirmance, without written opinion, on 
November 20, 1987. The instant petition for writ of certiorari 
follows that judgment, and seeks a reversal thereof. 
II 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties1 Decree of Divorce (R, 23-29), entered 
March 4, 1983, was based on the stipulation of the parties and 
provided, inter alia, for the distribution of a large amount of 
personal and real property. Specifically, Mrs. Tipton received 
the parties1 residence at 1839 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 
subject to any encumbrances; a trout farm in the State of 
Missouri theretofore owned jointly by the parties; and other 
items of personal property, including $77,000.00 in cash. In 
addition, Plaintiff was granted the following: 
6 
A fifty percent (50%) partnership share of 
the balance due to the parties hereto from 
the Sierra Pacific Note, said fifty percent 
share to be paid directly to plaintiff as the 
funds are received by L. Darrell Christensen. 
(R. 27) 
The Sierra Pacific Note was an obligation payable to a 
partnership known as the Winecup Ranch. Mrs. Tipton had alleged 
prior to the original divorce settlement that she was a partner, 
and it was upon this circumstance that the fifty percent share 
was based. 
On September 21, 1986, Plaintiff initiated proceedings 
against Mr. Tipton by Order to Show Cause (R, 35-36), to which 
Mr. Tipton objected with his own action for relief. 
Defendant then filed as a separate document his 
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE (R, 49-52) on February 25, 
1985, wherein he sought, insofar as is pertinent here, the 
following relief: 
1. to alter the distribution of marital property, 
2. to reallocate the debts and obligations of the 
marriage, including IRS obligations; 
On March 21, 1985 the foregoing matters were heard 
before James s. Sawaya, District Judge. Counsel stipulated that 
the evidence could be proffered. Therefore, no sworn testimony 
was taken, either from the parties themselves or from their 
respective expert witnesses. The Court's memorandum decision of 
7 
April 26, 1985 and the order entered thereafter on May 9, 1985 
(R, 119-120) provided, insofar as is pertinent hereto, as 
follows: 
1. !f. • . that the Defendant Monte Tipton should be 
required to pay the tax liabilities associated with the tax 
returns for 1979, 1980, and 1981 and 1982." 
2. "With regard to issue number 4, the Court finds 
that the Plaintiff is not a partner of the Winecup Ranch and that 
she is entitled to a 1/2 of the distributions from the 
partnership share of Monte Tipton." 
3. ,fWith regard to issue number 6, the Court finds a 
[sic] factual basis on which to allocate or reallocate the debts 
and obligations incurred during the marriage including the 
obligations to the IRS.M 
On May 20, 1985 Defendant filed his MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL; TO TAKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY; TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT (R, 123-126) 
The Court denied Defendant's motion in its entirety by 
order entered on May 20, 1986 [erroneously designated May 20, 
1985] (R, 149-150). 
The appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals followed, filed 
June 13, 1986 (R, 151-152), where Mr. Tipton sought relief from 
the trial court's orders of May 9, 1985 and May 20, 1986, 
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respectively. Mr. Tipton now seeks Reversal of the order of 
affirmance of the Utah Court of Appeals, entered November 20, 
1987. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING ANlD ORDER THAT 
CELIA SHERWOOD TIPTON IS NOT A PARTNER OF 
MONTE DEE TIPTON IN THE WINECUP RANCH 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
1. The trial court's llfindings,, on the existence or 
non-existence of a partnership are wholly Inadequate and in 
conflict with the decisions of this court. The trial court, in 
its memorandum decision of April 16, 1985 made as its sole 
"finding11 on the issue of the existence of non-existence of a 
partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton the following: 
With regard to issue number' 4, the Court 
finds that the plaintiff is not a partner of 
the Winecup Ranch and that she is entitled to 
a 1/2 of the distribution from the 
partnership share of Monte Tipton. 
The foregoing "finding'1 was set forth in its exact form 
in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, f6. (R, 116) 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereafter 
"URCP," requires the Court to state the facts upon which a 
judgment is based as follows: 
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In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury . . . the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, . . . 
Rule 52(b), URCP, provides the vehicle through which 
the court may amend its original findings or make new findings as 
follows: 
Upon mot ion of a p a r t y made not l a t e r than 
t e n days a f t e r e n t r y of judgment t he c o u r t 
may amend i t s f i n d i n g s or make a d d i t i o n a l 
f i n d i n g s and may amend t h e j u d g m e n t 
accord ing ly . 
In t h i s case , the judge did n e i t h e r , which c o n s t i t u t e s 
r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . With regard to the su f f i c i ency of f ind ings of 
f a c t , in ma t t e r s r e l a t i n g to i s sues with s u b s t a n t i a l economic 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s , t h i s Court has unequivocal ly s t a t e d in the case of 
Montoya v^ _ Montoya, 2 UAR 7 (1985) at 7-8 as fo l lows : 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t ha t such de te rmina t ions be 
b a s e d on p r o p e r f i n d i n g s of f a c t and 
conclus ions of law. 
Furthermore, t h i s Court in Montoya a t 8 r e i t e r a t e d t h a t the 
requirements of Rule 52(a), URCP apply to domestic ac t ions for 
m o d i f i c a t i o n , c i t i n g as a u t h o r i t a t i v e i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n in 
Stoddard v. Stoddard, Utah, 642 P.2d 743, 744 (1982). 
Th i s Court has even more r e c e n t l y d i s c u s s e d the 
requirements t ha t proper f indings of fac t be promulgated by the 
t r i a l judge in t he case of Smith v^ Smi th , 43 UAR 5 (1986) . 
Although the i s s u e of appea l in t h e Smith ca se was t h a t of 
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custody, the requirements regarding adequate findings are equally 
applicable in this case. The Smith Court stated at 6 that 
To ensure that the trial Court's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, 
[citing] Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 
at 41, is rationally Tased, it IT essential 
that the Court set forth in its findings of 
fact not only that it finds one parent to be 
the better person to care for the child, but 
also the basic facts which show why that 
ultimate conclusion is justified, [emphasis 
in original] 
The Court at 6 and 7 further explained that the ultimate 
conclusion be the logical result of and supported by evidence and 
applicable controlling legal principles, without which the 
Appellate Court cannot discharge its review function. These 
requirements are further recognized in two current decisions of 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 
(1987) and Epstein v^ Epstein, 741 P.2d 974 (1987). 
The "findings11 in this case, if indeed they rise to 
that level, suffer from the same inadequacies as those of the 
Smith case. There is no citation of !fbasic factsn by the Court 
to support its conclusion that Celia Sherwood Tipton was not a 
partner in the Winecup Ranch. There exists only the conclusion, 
with no factual support whatsoever, for this Court to review. 
2. The only evidence adduced at trial mandates the 
existence of a partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton relative 
to the Sierra Pacific Note. A partnership may arise in at least 
11 
three (3) different ways, to-wit: (1) by express contract; 
(2) by implied contract; or (3) by estoppel. Yoder v. Hooper, 
Colo. App., a 695 P.2d 1182 (1984); 48-1-4, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), hereafter "UCA"; and 48-1-13, UCA. 
Furthermore, a partnership may legally exist between 
husband and wife. As the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Commissioner v^ Tower, 327 US 280, 290; 90 L.Ed. 67; 66 S. Ct. 
532 (1946), 
There can be no q u e s t i o n t h a t a w i f e and a 
husband may, under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
become p a r t n e r s f o r t a x , as f o r o t h e r 
purposes . 
I t i s t h e p o s i t i o n of Monte D. T i p t o n t h a t a 
p a r t n e r s h i p ex i s t ed as a mat te r of law between himsel f and h i s 
e x - w i f e , e i t h e r e x p r e s s l y , i m p l i e d in law or by e s t o p p e l , and 
t ha t i t was e r r o r for the Court to find o the rwise . 
The record r evea l s the fol lowing informat ion , and only 
t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , r e l a t i n g to t h e e x i s t e n c e or non-
ex i s t ence of a p a r t n e r s h i p : 
1. The o r i g i n a l Decree of Divorce of Februa ry 8, 
1983, which provides t h a t P l a i n t i f f r e c e i v e : 
A f i f t y p e r c e n t (50%) p a r t n e r s h i p s h a r e of 
the balance due to the p a r t i e s he re to from 
the S i e r r a Pac i f i c Note, sa id f i f t y percent 
share to be paid d i r e c t l y to p l a i n t i f f as the 
funds are received by L. Dar re l l Chr i s t ensen . 
12 
2. The p a r t i e s 1 s t i p u l a t i o n of October 22, 1982, 
which conta ins language i d e n t i c a l to the foregoing. 
3 . The following evidence pr|offered at t r i a l : 
a. S t a t e m e n t s of Richard B. McKeown, P l a i n t i f f ' s 
a t t o r n e y , proffered as test imony on behalf of P l a i n t i f f : 
[ t ] h e r e was a claim tha t Sarah [ s i c ] Tipton 
i s a general pa r tne r . We have denied t h a t , 
s e e i n g no documen ta t i on to the e f f e c t t h a t 
she i s . (R, 159 L 5-7) 
Now, i s s u e number four 
determine whether or not 
of the Winecup Ranch. I 
she i s a p a r t n e r but I 
have d o c u m e n t a t i o n t o 
a n o t h e r whe the r she i s 
Winecup Ranch, 
to t he d e c r e e 
asks t h i s Court t o 
Cel ia i s a pa r tne r 
do not be l i eve tha t 
don ' t b e l i e v e they 
p r o v e one way or 
a p a r t n e r of the 
Our p o s i t i o n i$ tha t pursuant 
she i s only e n t i t l e d to one-
from 
s i g n 
a 
no t s ign a 
she cannot be 
q u i e s c e n c e of 
in t h i s decree 
a p a r t n e r s h i p 
h a l f of a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n 
p a r t n e r s h i p , t h a t she did! 
p a r t n e r s h i p ag reemen t , t h a t 
made a p a r t n e r s imply by ac 
other p a r t i e s and t h a t we have 
as p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t not 
i n t e r e s t t h a t ' s c rea ted , and I th ink we w i l l 
l e a v e t h a t a t t h a t because I* a g a i n , don ' t 
t h i n k t h e r e a r e documents s u f f i c i e n t to 
w a r r a n t t h e Court in making t h a t d e c i s i o n . 
We don ' t have any s igned p a r t n e r s . The 
p a r t n e r s don't know if they e x i s t . (R, 12 L 
8-22) 
The c o n c e p t 
p a r t n e r s h i p i s 
t o h a n d l e , 
a c q u i e s c e n c e 
something t h a t 
not someth ing 
of t h e de f d c t o g e n e r a l 
one tha t i s d i f f i c u l t for me 
A p a r t n e r s h i p r e q u i r e s 
by p a r t n e r s . I t i s no t 
occurs spontaneously. I t i s 
t h a t occu r s by o r d e r of t he 
Cour t . What the Court has to dea l w i t h i s 
p roper ty d i s t r i b u t i o n . I don't th ink t h a t by 
i m p l i c a t i o n or o t h e r w i s e tl)ie C o u r t can 
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r equ i r e t h a t Cel ia become a general pa r t ne r 
in a p r o p e r t y or in any p a r t n e r s h i p of any 
k ind . I t ' s he r i m p r e s s i o n t h a t she never 
signed a p a r t n e r s h i p agreement. I th ink tha t 
i s refuted but nothing has been produced to 
i n d i c a t e t h a t she d id . I t i s our p o s i t i o n 
t h a t she i s not in f a c t a p a r t n e r , in f a c t , 
upon r e c e i p t of k-1 for 1983, the f i r s t tax 
year , she received a K-1. She ind ica ted tha t 
she f e l t she was not a pa r tne r and subsequent 
to t ha t we have w r i t t e n a l e t t e r to the other 
g e n e r a l p a r t n e r , D a r r e l l C h r i s t e n s e n , 
i n d i c a t i n g we do no t b e l i e v e she i s a 
p a r t n e r . (R, 178 L 20 - R, 179 L 11) 
. . . I t h i n k the p a r t n e r s h i p r e q u i r e s a l s o 
C e l i a T i p t o n ' s a c q u i e s c e n c e . She h a s 
ind ica ted she d idn ' t want to be involved with 
t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . I s u g g e s t t h a t t h i s 
i nvo lved more than one n o t e , as many as 
s e v e n t y - o n e or s e v e n t y - t w o n o t e s . She 
p a r t i c i p a t e s in no other no tes , only in the 
S i e r r a Pac i f i c Note. (R, 182 L 1-7) 
b . S t a t e m e n t s of P e t e r W. Guyon, D e f e n d a n t ' s 
a t t o r n e y , p r o f f e r e d as t e s t i m o n y on b e h a l f of Defendant and 
Defendant ' s exper t wi tness William G. Gibson: 
Now, the i ssue of p a r t n e r s h i p shares has been 
b r o u g h t up. I r e f e r t o Mr. McKeown's 
s c h e m a t i c d rawing of the Winecup Ranch 
p a r t n e r s h i p which we do not ag ree w i t h . In 
the f i r s t p l ace , I am lead to be l i eve in the 
Winecup Ranch p a r t n e r s h i p - - I don't have any 
documents e i t h e r , Your Honor, but I don ' t 
th ink the re n e c e s s a r i l y have to be documents. 
I th ink t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s , if nothing e l s e , 
she i s a de fac to general pa r tne r by v i r t u e 
of the fac t t ha t not only did she en t e r in to 
t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and s e t t l e m e n t agreement 
accept ing a f i f t y - p e r c e n t p a r t n e r s h i p share 
but a l s o by a c c e p t i n g and f i l i n g - - t h a t was 
given to her the re with a K-1 form which i s 
to be f i l e d by p a r t n e r s of the p a r t n e r s h i p . 
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She did, it is my understanding, file those 
K-l forms out of the distributed share from 
the fall of 1981 or previously. (R, 175 L 9-
22) 
I stand corrected on that issue. Issue 
number five, at the time the funds were 
placed in the trust, he had rights of 
ownership in them. It is our position that 
not only does the.settlement agreement 
reflect de facto partnership, not only 
written partnership, the Divorce Decree does. 
She received the funds, some of those funds, 
filed the K-l form to reflect the receipt of 
the payment and [sic] I think that the issue 
of whether or not — whether they were her 
funds or whoever [sic] they were, I am not 
sure if that is even correct or whether that 
is important but certainly she received a 
partnership share and was, if nothing else, a 
de facto partner. (R, 177 L 11-22) 
If I could quickly respond to these last two 
things that may put this to rest. 
Acquiescence of partners, Mr. McKeown has 
stated it takes acquiescence of partners to 
make a partner. We have acquiescence of 
Darrell Christensen and Mr. Tipton and Keith 
Christensen. We have nothing before the 
Court and no sign of anything that indicates 
(anything other than acquiescense to that very 
same thing that Mr. Christensen was 
specifically advised by Mr. Tipton that he 
[was giving her a partnership share. He 
acquiesced in that. (R, 180 L 19 - R, 181 L 
3) 
Let me make one short statement on 6 and I 
will be ready to go. I haven't had an 
opportunity to address that. That is on the 
one hand Mr. McKeown is attempting to assert 
and hide behind the provisions of the decree 
but on the other side attempts to find that 
Mrs. Tipton was not a partner in these 
amounts that have been paid, thereby 
attempting to change the tax liability and I 
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will point out to the Court--at least my 
understanding is that if she is not a general 
partner then the tax liability falls upon Mr. 
Tipton. If she is a partner, which she has 
acquiesced to be, then the tax liability 
falls upon her. I am not sure the Court 
understands the ramifications of that. (R, 
185 L 18 - R, 186 L 4) 
Accordingly, the issue of the existence or non-
existence of the partnership must succeed or fail on the 
foregoing facts alone. It is Defendant's allegation that the 
only competent evidence on the record mandates the existence of 
the alleged partnership. 
Under Utah Law, UCA 48-1-4 sets forth various rules to 
be used in determining the existence or non-existence of a 
partnership. In fact, a presumption arises under 48-1-4(4) that 
a partnership exists under the following circumstances: 
(4) the receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business is prima facie evidence 
that he is a partner in the business, . . . 
In this case, the ''business" was the purchase and resale of 
the Winecup Ranch. The Sierra Pacific Note and the proceeds 
thereof are the profits of said business. In fact, the 
stipulation and decree clearly establish both points. They both 
provide that Plaintiff receive a "partnership share of the 
balance due to the parties." [emphasis added] The clear meaning 
and intent of this language has been misconstrued by the trial 
court. 
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Accordingly, the law presumes that Mrs. Tipton is a 
partner by virtue of her receipt of shares of the profits of a 
business, (See also Kimball v^ McCormick, Utah, 259 P. 313 
(1927)) Mr. Tipton does not argue that the presumption cannot be 
rebutted, but only that it has not been so rebutted as a matter 
of law. 
None of the proffered evidence really adds substantial 
competent information, other than to deny and allege, 
respectively, the existence of a partnership. The thrust of Mr. 
McKeown's proffer is that in the absence of documents, there is 
no partnership, which is not a correct statement of the law in 
any event. If anything, Mr. McKeownfs statement that Plaintiff 
received a K-l [partnership Return] for 1983 relating to funds 
received by Plaintiff from the Sierra Pacific Note (R, 179 1, 5-
7) supports the proposition she was a partner. That Plaintiff 
filed the K-l (R, 175 L 20-22) is undisputed. Thus, the only 
competent evidence is that there was a partnership, and the trial 
court's finding otherwise is clear error. 
If this Court does not find a partnership by the express 
agreement of the parties, the Court should imply the existence of 
one. This Court, in Bridgman v. Winsnissi, Utah, 98 p. 186 (1908) 
stated at 189: 
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The rule is well settled that the existence 
of a partnership may be implied from the 
circumstances, . . . 
In the case of Yoder v. Hooper, Colo. App., 695 P.2d 
1182 (1984), the Court defined partnership at 1187 as : 
. . . an express or implied contract between 
two or more persons to place their money, 
skill, effects or labor into a business and 
to share profits and losses. [citations 
omitted] Further, no express agreement is 
necessary; rather, a partnership may be 
formed by the conduct of the parties, 
[citations omitted.] 
The law of implied contracts is generally expressed in 
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts §255 as follows: 
Therefore, whatever may fairly be implied 
from the terms of nature of an instrument is, 
in the eyes of the law, contained in it. The 
law will imply a contractual obligation and 
enforce it if it is a necessary implication 
from the provisions of the instrument, or, in 
a proper case, from the language and 
circumstances of the agreement; and what is 
implied in law need not be expressed. 
The only competent evidence before the trial court was 
that a partnership existed, either expressly or impliedly. The 
only information countering that proposition are the allegations 
of Richard B. McKeown that Msince there are no papers there is no 
partnership." (R, 169) 
As has been discussed above, the intention of the 
parties expressed that Mrs. Tipton was receiving a partnership 
18 
interest; it did not say that she was to receive one-half of Mr. 
Tipton's share. 
If the Court does not find a partnership expressed or 
implied, it must find a partnership by estoppel. The doctrine of 
partnership by estoppel is set forth in 68 CJS 49, Partnership, 
§21, as follows: 
In a c t i o n s be tween a l l e g e d c o - p a r t n e r s t h e 
d o c t r i n e of e s t o p p e l w i l l be a p p l i e d where 
one of t h e p a r t i e s h a s r e p u d i a t e d or 
abandoned the agreement and s u b s e q u e n t l y 
endeavors to take advantage of i%, or , having 
accepted and acted on an agreement to form a 
p a r t n e r s h i p , now s e e k s t o d i s c l a i m t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Pe r sons who have a d m i t t e d 
e x p r e s s l y or by c o n d u c t , t h a t t h e y a r e 
p a r t n e r s h i p s w i l l be held to tha]: admission. 
This general p ropos i t i on i s recognized in t h i s S t a t e in the 
p rov i s ions of 48-1-13, UCA, as fo l lows: 
(1) When a pe r son by words spoken or by 
conduct r e p r e s e n t s h i m s e l f , or c o n s e n t s to 
a n o t h e r ' s r e p r e s e n t i n g him, to anyone as a 
p a r t n e r in an e x i s t i n g p a r t n e r s h i p or w i t h 
one or more persons not ac tua l p a r t n e r s , he 
i s l i a b l e to any such pe r son whom such 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has been made who has on the 
f a i t h of such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n given c r e d i t to 
the ac tua l or apparent p a r t n e r s h i p , . . . 
I t i s recognized tha t no t h i r d pa r ty has been extended 
" c r e d i t " on the b a s i s of a p p a r e n t p a r t n e r s h i p . However, t he 
p r i n c i p l e of es toppel can and should apply in r e l a t i o n s between 
a l l e g e d or a p p a r e n t p a r t n e r s . The b a s i s of e s t o p p e l i s t h e 
mis leading of another by ac t s or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s upon which one 
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relies to his detriment. Mr. Tipton has relied to his detriment 
in the same fashion and has relied to his detriment on the 
apparent partnership, and the Court should find a partnership by-
estoppel between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton. 
II 
THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE OF FEBRUARY 22, 1985 IS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
1. The trial courtfs ruling was unsupported by 
adequate findings as required by Rule 52 (a), URCP and as such is 
in conflict with decisions of this court. As has been discussed 
above, Rule 52(a), URCP, requires adequate written findings to 
support the conclusions and rulings of the Court. In this case, 
the Court made the following "finding" on the modification issues 
as a group: 
Those f a c t s upon which defendant r e l i e s as a 
b a s i s fo r and grounds to modify t he d e c r e e 
are f a c t s which t h i s court b e l i e v e s could 
h a v e , w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e , b e e n 
d i s c o v e r e d and produced a t t he t ime t h e 
decree was en t e r ed . (R, 115) 
The f inding is in i t s e l f only a conclus ion , and nothing 
e l s e . I t s u f f e r s from the same i n a d e q u a c i e s as t he C o u r t ' s 
f ! f i n d i n g f l , d i s c u s s e d In d e t a i l a b o v e , t h a t t h e r e was no 
p a r t n e r s h i p be tween Mr. and Mrs. T i p t o n . There s imp ly i s no 
w r i t t e n , l o g i c a l and f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t which l e a d s t o and 
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supports the Court's decision and conclusion. Accordingly, the 
ruling relating to the issues of modification must be overturned. 
2. The only competent evidence before the trial court 
mandated the Court's finding of a substantial change of 
circumstances. The substance of Mr. Tipton's petition to modify, 
insofar as it is relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, is 
that the tax consequences of the original Divorce Decree were 
unknown to Defendant at the time the stipulation leading to the 
divorce was executed, that they could not have been known to him; 
and that the ramifications thereof have devastated Mr. Tipton. 
(R, 51) The fact they were unknown and not within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the divorce 
constitutes the basis for Mr. Tipton's allegations of a 
substantial change of circumstances. 
In support of his contentions Mr. Tipton caused to be 
proffered at the trial his testimony and that of William G. 
Gibson, Mr. Tipton's accountant during the period in question. 
Mr. Gibson, who was present in the Court, was an experienced CPA, 
having had 15 years' experience. (R 19, L 8-12) The proffered 
testimony of Gibson and Mr. Tipton is that Mr. Tipton came to 
Gibson in 1981 for help with Mr. Tipton^s income tax returns. 
Mr. Tipton had had another CPA previously, i.e., Gail Parsons, in 
whose possession the relevant documents had been deposited. 
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Because of the latterfs severe medical problems, however, Mr, 
Tipton was unable to get the records from Parsons which were 
needed by Gibson to complete the returns. Likewise, Gibson had a 
great deal of difficulty, and literally tried for 1\ to 2 years 
before getting information sufficient to file the returns for 
1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982. The result of Mr. Tipton's tax 
problems was that he owed over $211,000 to the IRS instead of the 
$122,000 he had planned on. (R 173, L9 - R 174, L 12) Mr. 
Tipton's actual tax obligation was approximately $88,000 higher 
than he had anticipated at the time of the divorce. (R 174, L 2-
12) 
Mr. McKeown attempted to refute the testimony of Mr. 
Tipton and Mr. Gibson by proffering the testimony of Richard C. 
Seamons, Mrs. Tipton's CPA. (R 177, L 23 - R 178, L 4) However, 
since Seamons was Mrs. Tipton's CPA and had no contact with or 
knowledge of the preparation of the tax returns or the problems 
involved in getting the information necessary to file the same, 
Mr. Seamons' "knowledge" is without foundation and cannot be 
considered by the Court. It remains, then, that the only 
competent evidence on the record was that proffered by Mr. Tipton 
and Mr. Gibson, and the Court was bound to rely upon it. Its 
failure to do so is reversible error. 
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This Court has recognized the validity of Mr. Tipton's 
position in its recent case of Thompson v. Thompson, Utah, 21 UAR 
18 (1985). In Thompson the ex-wife sought to modify the Decree 
of Divorce to add a debt to her ex-husbandfs obligations which 
had not been considered at the time of the divorce. Although the 
trial court did not specifically state or find that a 
"substantial change of circumstances'1 had taken place, this Court 
upheld the lower Court's ruling and found at 19 that 
[the trial court's] findings and supporting 
evidence are sufficient indicia in this case 
that such a substantial change had taken 
place since the decree, which was not within 
the original contemplation of tlje parties or 
the court at the time the original decree was 
rendered. 
Accordingly, the fact that the tax consequences of the 
settlement agreement and the resulting Decree of Divorce were not 
in the contemplation of the parties — or the Court, for that 
matter — cons t itute a substantial change of circumstances 
sufficient to allow the Court to consider a modification of the 
original Decree of Divorce. The fact that the Court did not do 
so under the facts of this case is reversible error. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s , the /? day of January, 
1988. 
6t} Tt r— 
;r W. Guyon 
;torney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the date below four 
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS were hand delivered to 
Richard B. McKeown of Parker, McKeown & McConkie at 505 East 200 
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
/4 DATED this day of Janua 
fK__ 
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APPENDIX 
Order of Affirmance, Utah Court of Appeals, entered November 
20, 1987. 
Order, Third District Court, entered May 20, 1986 
(erroneously designated 1985) denying Defendants MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL; TO TAKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY; TO AMEND FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT. 
Order, Third District Court, entered May 9, 1985, providing, 
inter alia, that Plaintiff was not a partner in the Winecup 
Ranch. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Third District 
Court, entered May 9, 1985 in support of order described in 
number 3 above. 
Decree of Divorce, Third District Court, entered March 4, 
1983. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Third District 
Court, entered March 4, 1983 in support of Decree of Divorce. 
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APPENDIX 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Celia Sherwood Tipton, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Monte Dee Tipton, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Orme, Davidson and Greenwood (On Rule 31 Panel). 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 860205-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Double 
costs are awarded to respondent under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. O'Brien v. Rush, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18, 20-21 (Ct. App. 1987). 
FOR THE COURT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
€, M <T' ^ o /?$•? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of November, 1987, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Peter W. Guyon, Esq. 
Guyon & Guyon 
1000 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Richard B. McKeown, Esq. 
Parker McKeown & McConkie 
505 East 200 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Hon. James S. Sawaya. 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
Dist. Ct. #D82-3162 
Julia Ov-Whitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
APPENDIX 2 
Richard B. McKeown #2206 of 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-5511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA TIPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MONTE DEE TIPTON, 
Defendant. 
i ORDER 
i Judge James Sawaya 
1 Civil No. D82-3162 
The Defendants Motion for New Trial, To Take Additional 
Testimony, To Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and to Amend Judgment came on regularly for hearing on the 23rd 
day of September, 1985. Plaintiff was present and was represent-
ed by her counsel, Richard B. McKeown of Parker, McKeown & 
McConkie. The defendant was not present but was represented by 
his counsel, Peter W. Guyon of Guyon & Guyon. On the basis of 
the pleadings before the Court and the argument of counsel IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Defendant's Motion is denied. 
DATED this 9C day of I 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge James Sawaya 
Approved as to Form: 
Pteter W, Guyon 
APPENDIX 3 
Richard B. McKeown #2206 of 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 363-5511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA SHERWOOD TIPTON, ) 
) ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Judge Sawaya 
MONTE DEE TIPTON, ) Civil No. D82-3162 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on 
the 21st day of March, 1985. Richard B. McKeown of Parker, 
McKeown & McConkie appeared for the Plaintiff and Peter W. Guyon 
of Guyon & Guyon appeared for the Defendant. The matter was 
fully presented, argued, and submitted pursuant to Stipulation of 
the parties and upon a proffer of evidence. The Court having 
taken the matter under advisement, having fully considered the 
issues together with the evidence, now ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND 
DECREES as follows: 
1. That the Stipulation of Property Settlement Agreement 
entered into by the parties together with the Decree which 
encompasses all of the Stipulation was a Stipulation fully 
negotiated by the parties with full knowledge of the facts as 
they then existed. Additionally, those facts upon which the 
Defendant relies as a basis for and grounds to modify the Decree 
are facts which this Court believes could have, with reasonable 
diligence, been discovered and produced at the time the Decree 
was entered. 
2. That neither party is in contempt. 
3. That Defendant, Monte Tipton is ordered to pay the tax 
liabilities associated with the tax returns for 1979, 1980, 
1981, and 1982. 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant 
for the sum of $113,601.98. 
5. Defendant is ordered to remove the liens on the resi-
dence of the parties on Logan Avenue. 
6. That the Plaintiff is not a partner of the Wine Cup 
Ranch and that Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the distribu-
tions from the partnership share of Monte Tipton. 
7. That the funds placed in trust by L. D. Christensen were 
funds of the Plaintiff who has ownership rights to them. 
8. That there is no factual basis upon which to allocate or 
reallocate the debts and obligations incurred during the marriage 
including the obligations to the IRS. 
9. That the findings of Commissioner Peuler regarding the 
issue of visitation is hereby adopted and accordingly visitation 
with the Defendant and the minor children of the parties is 
ordered as follows: 
For a period of four weeks the defendant is ordered to 
exercise visitation with the children every Saturday from 10:00 
a.m. until 6:00 p.m. After that period of time and following 
those regular visitations, the visitation rights of the defendant 
are ordered to revert to those specified ^n t h e decree. 
10. That Plaintiff is not restrained from the use and 
distribution of her share of the Sierra Pacific proceeds allocat-
ed for child support. 
11. That the Court does not order the appointment of an 
independent trustee for the proceeds which will be placed in 
trust for the benefit of the children and accordingly affirms the 
provisions of the Decree with regard to that issue. 
12. That Defendant is not entitled to the offsets claimed 
for the cash value received from the life insurance policy on 
Monte Tipton's life inasmuch as the policy was owned by the 
Plaintiff and she is entitled to the cash proceeds therefrom. 
13. That Defendant is entitled to an offset for the backhoe 
which is payable to him at the time the trout farm in Missouri is 
sold by the Plaintiff. 
14. That both parties should assume and pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
15. That Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the 
sum of $5,000 for the fees and costs associated with her account-
ant's services. 
DATED this _£ day of MAy ., 1985. 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT: 
J^mes S* Sawaya, Judge 
Peter Guyon 
Attorney for Defendant 
auuuic^ \ 
APPENDIX 4 
Richard B. McKeown #2206 of 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 363-5511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA SHERWOOD TIPTON, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) Judge ^awaya 
MONTE DEE TIPTON, ) Civil No. D82-3162 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable Judge Sawaya of 
the above-entitled Court, on the 21st day of March, 1985. 
Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by Richard 
B. McKeown of Parker, McKeown & McConkie. Defendant was present 
in Court and represented by Peter Guyon of Guyon & Guyon. The 
matter was fully presented, argued and submitted'pursuant to 
Stipulation of the parties and upon proffer of evidence. The 
Court having taken the matter under advisement, having fully 
considered the issues together with the evidence, now makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court feels in addressing the issues presented by 
the parties specifically those numbered 1 through 14 as presented 
by the plaintiff and stipulated to as being the issues to be 
addressed by the Court finds that the Stipulation of Property 
Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties together with 
the decree which encompasses all of the stipulation was a 
stipulation fully negotiated by the parties with full knowledge 
of the facts as they then existed. 
2. Those facts upon which defendant relies as a basis for 
and grounds to modify the decree are facts which this Court 
believes could have, with reasonable diligence, been discovered 
and produced at the time the decree was entered. 
3. Dealing specifically with the issues numbered 1 through 
14, issue number 1 dealing with the contempt of the defendant, 
the Court finds that the defendant is not in contempt nor does 
the Court find that the plaintiff in any way was in contempt. 
4. With regard to issue number 2, the Court finds that the 
defendant Monte Tipton should be required to pay the tax liabil-
ities associated with the tax returns for 1979, 1980, 1981 and 
1982. 
5. With regard to issue number 3, the Court finds that the 
plaintiff is entitled to and the Court awards her a judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of $113,601.98, and further 
that the defendant be required to retaove the liens on the 
residence of the parties on Logan Avenue. 
6. With regard to issue number 4, the Court finds that the 
plaintiff is not a partner of the Winecu)? Ranch and that she is 
entitled to 1/2 of the distributions from the partnership 
share of Monte Tipton. 
7. Issue number 5, the Court resolves in favor of the 
plaintiff in that the funds placed in tnfist by L. D. Christensen 
were funds of the plaintiff who has ownership rights to them. 
8. With regard to issue number 6, the Court finds no 
factual basis on which to allocate or reallocate the debts and 
obligations incurred during the marriagp including the obliga-
tions to the IRS. 
9. Dealing with issue number 7 rdgarding visitation, the 
Court finds that the Commissioner's recommendations are based 
upon sound facts and law and thereby accepts and affirms the 
Commissionerf s recommendations. 
10. Issue number 8, the Court finds no factual basis upon 
which the plaintiff should be restrained from the distribution of 
her share of the Sierra Pacific proceeds allocated for child 
support. 
11. As to issue number 9, the Court finds no basis upon 
which to appoint an independent trustee for the proceeds which 
will be placed in trust for the benefit of the children and in 
affect affirms the provisions of the decree with regard to that 
issue. 
12. With regard to issues 10 and 11 the Court finds that 
the defendant is not entitled to the offsets claimed by him for 
the money received as the cash value from the life insurance 
policy on Monte Tipton's life. The Court finds the policy was 
owned by the plaintiff and that she is entitled to the cash 
proceeds therefrom. 
13. With regard to issue number 12, the Court finds that 
the defendant is entitled to an offset for the backhoe but is not 
entitled to that offset at the present time but is entitled to it 
only upon sale of the Trout Farm in Missouri by the plaintiff. 
14. With regard to issues 13 and 14 the Court finds that 
the parties should assume and pay their own attorneys fees and 
costs except that plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable fees 
and costs of her accountant incurred in her attempt to settle 
with the Internal Revenue Service the claim made upon her 
property. The Court finds that a reasonable amount to be awarded 
to her for that regardless of the affidavit of her accountant is 
the sum of $5,000.00. 
15. Plaintifffs counsel may prepare and submit for the 
Court's signature an order consistent with these Findings of 
Fact. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The settlement arrived at by the Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Sawaya entered in the Court on the 26th day of April, 1985 
and reflected in the foregoing Findings of Fact, should be 
ratified, approved and confirmed in all particulars and embodied 
into an Order to be entered herein. 
DATED this ^ day of Wny , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
^/j?\\MS $• ZfaUUjA 
District Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Peter Guyon 
Attorney for Defendant 
APPENDIX 5 
Richard B. McKeown of 
PARKER, McKEOWN & KcCONKIE 
455 East South Temple, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STA1E OF UTAh 
CLL1A bhEKWOOD TIPTON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
MONTE DEE TIPTON, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1 Civil No? D82-3162 
THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable Judge Bryant 
H. Croft of the above-entitled Court, on the 8th day of February, 
1983. Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by Richard 
B. McKeown of Parker, McKeown & McConki^. Defendant was not 
present in Court. Upon the basis of record herein, the stipula-
tion of the parties, Plaintiff's sworn testimony, and pursuant to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L^w made in this matter, 
IT IS hEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce to become 
final three (3) months from the date of entry, unless dismissed 
or otherwise modified by order of court prior to said date. 
2. Permanent custody of the twq minor children herein 
identified is hereby vested in the Plaintiff CELIA SHERWOOD 
TIPTON, with the Defendant having rights of liberal visitation as 
hereafter set forth: 
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3. During the time period specified herein, the non-
custodial parent shall have liberal rights of visitation with the 
minor children except that as a minimum the non-custodial parent 
shall have the following rights of visitation: 
A. Every other weekend from Friday evening through 
Sunday evening; 
B. One day during the intervening week. 
C. Every other national holiday on alternating 
years. 
D. Two hours on Bather's Day and each child's 
birthday. 
E. A period of not less than two consecutive weeks 
up to two months during the school vacation period each 
year . 
4. in the event either plaintiff or defendant resides 
outside of the State of Utah during the minority of either of the 
two minor children, defendant Monte Dee Tipton shall exercise 
visitation with the said children for a period of two (2) months 
during each ana every summer in addition to the other visitation 
herein specified. Furthermore, while defendant exercises visita-
tion with either or both of the children, defendant shall have 
the authority to cause to be provided whatever medical care is 
necessary or appropriate for the child or children and in the 
event of major medical treatment shall notify plaintiff. 
5. Defendant is ordered to give plaintiff reasonable 
notice of his anticipated visitation. 
-3-
6. Plaintiff is ordered to be deposited in an irrevoc-
able trust under the trusteeship of an entity or individual 
designated by her the sum of One hundred Thousand Dollars 
(§100,000,00)/ which shall provide support for and in behalf of 
both of the minor children and shall be deposited under the terms 
and conditions herein set forth: 
A) Plaintiff is ordered to place in trust two (2) 
payments of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) each, 
the first payment to be made ir^  March.* 1965u and the 
subsequent payment to be made in September, 1905, from 
proceeds of the Sierra Pacific none which plaintiff 
shall receive on the dates indicated herein. 
B) Ihe trust corpus shall be divided into two (2) 
equal trusts, one for each minor child, and shall be 
invested in tax-free bonds or other securities to the 
extent that it is possible and to the extent that it is 
not possible the funds will be invested so as to provide 
the greatest amount of return, giving due consideration 
to the risks inherent in any such investment. 
C) The income of each trust shall be paid to 
plaintiff Celia Sherwood Tipton' as long as she is a 
custodial parent of the children not less often than 
quarterly as child support for and in behalf of each of 
the said minor children. 
D) Upon the attainment of each child of the age of 
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eighteen (lb) years, the income on that child's trust 
shall no longer be paid to plaintiff, but shall be 
distributed by the trustee, for purposes which include, 
but are not limited to, LDS missions, education, or 
other reasonable or necessary expenses, or accumulated 
in the trustee's discretion pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the trust agreement. 
E) Upon the attainment of each respective child of 
the age of twenty-one (21) years, and for each year 
therafter that child shall receive Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00) per year until that child reaches the age of 
thirty (30) at which time said child shall receive the 
balance of his trust, including any accrued interest. 
F) From the date of the parties' separation on or 
about May 1, 19S2, until the income payments contem-
plated herein commence, plaintiff shall be solely re-
sponsible for the support of the minor children. 
G) Plaintiff shall have the right to designate the 
trustee of the trust funds herein described, but in the 
event said funds are lost or dissipated shall have no 
right to seek replacement funds from defendant Monte Dee 
Tipton. 
h) Both parties shall execute any and all docu-
ments of transfer reasonable and necessary to effectuate 
the terms ot this agreement. 
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7. Neither party hereto is ^warded any alimony as 
against the other. 
8. That as a complete and firtal property settlement 
agreement, plaintiff shall have and receive as her sole and 
separate property and estate, free of any claim of right, title 
or interest in defendant, the following property: 
A) The previous residence of the parties located 
at 1839 Logan Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to any 
and all liens and obligations existing against said 
property as of the date of the parties' separation. 
b) The trout farm owned jointly by the parties in 
the state of Missouri, including all land jointly owned 
surrounding said trout farm, si+ibject to any and all 
liens and liabilities against said property and includ-
ing all equipment and other personal property connected 
therewith. 
C) A fifty percent (50%) partnership share of the 
balance due to the parties hereto from the Sierra 
Pacific note, said fifty percent share to be paid di-
rectly to plaintiff as the funds are received by L. 
Darrell Lhristensen. 
D) The furniture and furnishings contained in the 
residence at 1839 Last Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
h) Plaintiff's clothing, jewelry and any other 
items given by defendant to plaintiff during the course 
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of the parties* marriage, 
F) Seventy-seven Thousand Dollars ($77,000.00) in 
cash paid on September 1, 1982. 
9. Detendant shall have and receive out of the property 
of the parties hereto as his sole and separate estate, free of 
any claim of right, title, or interest in plaintiff any and all 
items of real and/or personal property not specified above as 
being the property of plaintiff, including any and all personal 
and real property owned, held, or obtained by defendant at any 
time prior to, during, or subsequent to the parties' marriage. 
10. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay any and all 
obligations incurred by her since the date of the parties' separ-
ation on May 1, 1982, in addition to the liabilities against the 
Logan Avenue House ana the trout farm identified elsewhere here-
in. 
11. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all obliga-
tions incurred by him solely and in his own name from the date of 
the parties' separation on May 1, 1982. 
12. Defendant is ordered to pay all joint debts prior 
to May 1, 1982, which are not specified herein and shall hold 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
13. 'Ihat all claims of any nature whatsoever that 
either party may have against the other, whether the same be 
known or unknown, or may have arisen out of the marriage rela-
tionship or otherwise, other than those specifically set forth in 
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this decree of divorce, are hereby deemed waived. 
lis T day of M>ft$jLA\ , 1963 DATED thj 
BY THE COURT 
/ A to form: 
rGuyon,\ \x/\i. r uyon,1 
A t t o r n e y / f o r Defendant 
DOC43rSr 
APPENDIX 6 
Richard B. McKeown of 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKI£ 
455 Last South Temple, Suite 101 
bait Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5 511 
LN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CJ>F SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELlA SHERWOOD TIPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
MONTE DEE TIPTON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF| FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS! OF LAW 
Civil No: D82-3162 
THIS MATTER was heard before the (Honorable Judge Bryant 
H. Croft of the above-entitled Court, on th|e bth day of February, 
1983. Plaintiff was present in Court and Represented by Richard 
B. McKeown of Parker, McKeown & McConkie|. Defendant was not 
present in Court. Upon the basis of record* herein, the stipula-
tion of the parties, and Plaintiff's sworn testimony, the court, 
being fully advised, makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. rihe parties hereto are husbancj and wife having been 
married on the 29th day of October, 1978 in the City of Elko, 
State of Nevada. 
2. The parties hereto are parentsl of the following two 
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children, both of whom are under the age of majority: AZELIA 
TIPTON, a female, age 1, born May 12, 1981 and STEPHEN TYREL 
TIPTON, a male, age 1 year, born December 13, 1981. 
3. Defendant has treated Plaintiff cruelly in that he 
left Plaintiff and otherwise indicated by his actions that he no 
longer wanted to be married. 
4. Permanent custody of the two minor children herein 
identified should be vested in the Plaintiff CELIA SHERWOOD 
TIPTON, with the Defendant having rights of liberal visitation as 
hereafter set forth; 
5. During the time period specified herein, the non-
custodial parent should have liberal rights of visitation with 
the minor children except that as a minimum the non-custodial 
parent shall have the following rights of visitation: 
A. Every other weekend from friday evening through 
Sunday evening; 
B. One aay dux'ing the intervening week. 
C. Every other national holiday on alternating 
years. 
D. Two hours on Father's Day and each child's 
birthday. 
E. A period of not less than two consecutive weeks 
up to two months during the school vacation period each 
year • 
6. In the event either plaintiff or defendant resides 
outside of the State of Utah during the minority of either of the 
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two minor children, defendant Monte Dee Tipton shall exercise 
visitation with the said children for a period of two (2) months 
during each and every summer in addition tlo the other visitation 
herein specified. Furthermore, while defendant exercises visita-
tion with either or both of the children, defendant shall have 
the authority to cause to be provided whatever medical care is 
necessary or appropriate for the child or children and in the 
event of majpr medical treatment shall notify plaintiff. 
Deflendant should give plaintiff reasonable notice of his 
anticipated Visitation. 
7. Plaintiff should cause to b£ deposited in an ir-
revocable trust under the trusteeship of a|n entity or individual 
designated by her the sum of One hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.00), which shall provide support for and in behalf of 
both of the minor children and shall be deposited under the terms 
and conditions herein set forth; 
A) Plaintiff should place |n trust two (2) pay-
ments of Fifty Thousand Dollars ^§50,000.00) each, the 
first payment to be made in March,i 1985, and the subse-
quent payment to be made in September, 1985, from pro-
ceeds of the Sierra Pacific note iwhich plaintiff shall 
receive on the dates indicated herein. 
B) The trust corpus shall bel divided into two (2) 
equal trusts, one for each minor child, and shall be 
invested in tax-free bonds or otljer securities to the 
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extent that it is possible and to the extent that it is 
not possible the funds will be invested so as to provide 
the greatest amount of return, giving due consideration 
to the risks inherent in any such investment. 
C) The income of each trust shall be paid to 
plaintiff Celia Sherwood Tipton as long as she is a 
custodial parent of the children not less often than 
quarterly as child support for and in behalf of each of 
the said minor children. 
D) Upon the attainment of each child of the age of 
eighteen (18) years, the income on that child's trust 
shall no longer be paid to plaintiff, but shall be 
distributed by the trustee, for purposes which include, 
but are not limited to, LDS missions, education, or 
other reasonable or necessary expenses, or accumulated 
in the trustee's discretion pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the trust agreement. 
E) Upon the attainment of each respective child of 
the age of twenty-one (21) years, and for each year 
therafter that child shall receive Five Thousand Dollars 
(§5,000.00) per year until that child reaches the age of 
thirty (30) at which time said child shall'receive the 
balance of his trust, including any accrued interest. 
P) From the date of the parties' separation on or 
about May 1, 1982, until the income payments contem-
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platea herein commence, plaintiff shall be solely re-
sponsible for the support of the minor children. 
G) Plaintiff shall have the right to designate the 
trustee of the trust funds herein described, but in the 
event saia tunas are lost or dissipated shall have no 
right to seek replacement funds from defendant Monte Dee 
Tipton. 
h) Both parties shall execute any and all docu-
ments of transfer reasonable and necessary to effectuate 
the terms of this agreement. 
8. Neither party hereto should lie awarded any alimony 
as against the other. 
9. That as a complete and fina^ l property settlement 
agreement, plaintiff should have and receive as her sole and 
separate property and estate, free of any claim of right, title 
or interest in defendant, the following prqperty: 
A) The previous residence of the parties located 
at 1839 Logan Ave., Salt Lake City), Utah, subject to any 
and all liens and obligations Existing against said 
property as of the date of the parities' separation. 
B) Ihe trout farm owned jointly by the parties in 
the state of Missouri, including ^11 land jointly owned 
surrounding said trout farm, subject to any and all 
liens and liabilities against said property and includ-
ing all equipment and other personal property connected 
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therewith. 
C) t\ fifty percent (50%) partnership share of the 
balance due to the parties hereto from the Sierra 
Pacific note, said fifty percent share to be paid di-
rectly to plaintiff as the funds are received by L. 
Darrell Christensen. 
D) The furniture and furnishings contained in the 
residence at 1839 East Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
E) Plaintiff's clothing, jewelry and any other 
items given by defendant to plaintiff during the course 
of the parties' marriage. 
F) Seventy-seven Thousand Dollars ($77,000.00) in 
cash paid on September 1, 1982. 
10. Defendant shall have and receive out of the prop-
erty of the parties hereto as his sole and separate estate, free 
of any claim of right, title, or interest in plaintiff any and 
all items of real and/or personal property not specified above as 
being the property of plaintiff, including any and all personal 
and real property owned, held, or obtained by defendant at any 
time prior to, during, or subsequent to the parties' marriage. 
11. Plaintiff shall assume and pay any and all obliga-
tions incurred by her since the date of the parties' separation 
on May 1, 1982, in addition to the liabilities against the Logan 
Avenue House and the trout farm identified elsewhere herein. 
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12^ Defendant shall assume and pay all obligations 
incurred by him solely and in his own nart^ e from the date of the 
parties1 separation on May 1, 1982. 
13.1 Defendant shall pay all joint debts prior to May 1, 
1982, which are not specified herein anq shall hold plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
14.1 Ihat all claims of any njature whatsoever that 
either party may have against the other, whether the same be 
known or unknown, or may have arisen out of the marriage rela-
tionship or otherwise, other than those specifically set forth in 
these findings of fact, are hereby deemed Uaived. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff, CELIA SHERWOOD TIP'!ON, should be awarded 
a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, MO^TE DEE TIPTON, on the 
grounds of mental cruelty, the same to became final three months 
from the date of entry, unless dismissed or| otherwise modified by 
order of court prior to said date. 
2. The complaint and settlement 4rrive(3 at by stipula-
tion of the parties presented to the Court| and reflected in the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, should be ratified, approved and 
confirmed in all particulars and embodied into the Decree of 
Divorce to be entered herein 
AA AJDfilX 
, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this ^ L, day ot MM.CH 
